Rethink replacement: How an Asian refinery modernised FCC isolation with our fractionator isolation valve

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Rethink replacement: How an Asian refinery modernised FCC isolation with our fractionator isolation valve

IMI Publications

Written By IMI Publications

November 19, 2026

Across the world’s severe-service facilities, engineering teams recognise that maintenance, reliability and process safety are inseparable priorities.

Across the world’s severe-service facilities, engineering teams recognise that maintenance, reliability and process safety are inseparable priorities.

In a fluid catalytic cracking unit, or FCCU, controlling the boundary between the reactor-regenerator and the main fractionator is particularly important. During shutdown, air from the regenerator must be prevented from mixing with hydrocarbon gases from the main column. If the unit is not safely postured, this combination can create a hazardous atmosphere.

Traditionally, oil refineries have relied on a manual blind in the reactor vapour line to provide the physical isolation required for maintenance. However, installing, removing or turning a blind is a labour-intensive activity that can expose personnel to hazardous process conditions. It also extends shutdown or start-up programmes.

An automatic fractionator isolation valve, or FIV, provides refineries with an additional means of isolating the main fractionator from the reactor-regenerator. It can reduce personnel exposure during routine operating transitions, provide greater flexibility during start-up and shutdown, and support a more controlled approach to system isolation and blinding.

One of the largest oil and gas refineries in South Asia recently adopted this approach by upgrading its FCCU with a 100-inch automatic FIV. Installed in November 2025, it is IMI's largest FIV and one of the largest of its kind anywhere in the world.

What is a fractionator isolation valve?

A fractionator isolation valve is installed in the vapour line between the reactor and the inlet to the main fractionator, also referred to as the main column. Its purpose is to isolate the hydrocarbon-filled main fractionator system from the reactor-regenerator during shutdown, helping to prevent the inadvertent mixing of hydrocarbons and air. Across the refining industry, the technology may also be described as a reactor isolation valve (RIV), a reactor valve, an O10 valve or a main fractionator isolation valve. These names refer to valves serving the same fundamental isolation purpose.

The valve is typically used during start-up, shutdown and feed-outage scenarios. However, its role must be clearly understood. An isolation valve is not, in itself, considered adequate protection for personnel entry into equipment. Where personnel are required, installation of the designated blind remains necessary in accordance with the refinery’s approved isolation procedure.

Why is isolation critical in an FCCU?

The reactor-regenerator and main fractionator operate with fundamentally different process environments. The regenerator contains air, while the main fractionator and associated gas concentration system contain hydrocarbons.

FCCU Fractionator Isolation Valve with rectangular body, circular flanged opening and actuator assembly

Fractionator Isolation Valve designed for isolation within fluidised catalytic cracking units.


Industry experience has shown that an inadequate understanding of the unit’s pressure balance, combined with insufficient process safeguards, can allow these streams to mix, creating a hazardous atmosphere. Effective isolation is therefore an essential part of safely posturing an FCCU during shutdowns, feed outages and other abnormal operating conditions.

An FIV can improve the isolation of the main fractionator hydrocarbons from the reactor-regenerator and reduce the likelihood of a hazardous mixture developing. It can also reduce the need for personnel to turn or install a blind while directly exposed to the vapour line during certain operating transitions.

The operational challenge of manual blind installation

A manual blind is a solid metal plate installed in the process line to create a physical barrier. Within an FCCU, installing or turning the reactor vapour line blind is a major operation.

The system must be appropriately shut down and depressurised before the spacer or existing line component can be removed and the blind positioned. That process must later be reversed before the unit returns to normal operation. To install the manual blind, the facility would need a specialised team fitted with personal protective equipment to undertake the task, which could take up to 24 hours to complete. This meant that operational staff could be working close to process equipment that carried hydrocarbons at temperatures up to 315 °C.

Although this activity may only be undertaken during planned turnarounds or particular operating events, it can affect the critical path, consume specialist resources and expose personnel to the area around the process line.

How an FIV changes the isolation process

An automatic FIV enables your operators to establish process isolation without first sending a crew to manually manipulate the blind in the vapour line.

For the refinery project, the wider operational assessment indicated that the FIV could reduce an isolation activity that previously took between 12 and 24 hours to approximately two hours. A separate financial model that we used was based on a standardised half-cycle operating assumption of 0.5 hours for the automated valve, compared with 12 hours for the manual-blind option. These figures describe different assessment bases and should not be treated as identical measurements.

Crucially, this does not mean that the FIV eliminates the blind in every situation. If personnel entry is planned, the FIV can be used to isolate the main column system, allowing the required blind to be installed in accordance with the refinery’s approved isolation procedure. The valve, therefore, supports safer and more efficient isolation rather than replacing every function of a physical blind.

Improving FCCU start-up flexibility

The operational value of an FIV extends beyond the time required to move the valve. Without an RIV or FIV, a refinery choosing a blind-out start-up may need to remove the vapour-line blind before inventorying the main column and gas concentration system. The inventorying and heating process can take many hours and may extend the overall start-up sequence.

With an isolation valve closed, the main column and gas concentration system can be inventoried in parallel with reactor-regenerator start-up activities. Once the required conditions have been established, the valve can be opened at the appropriate point in the approved operating sequence. This creates an opportunity to reduce start-up time without exposing personnel to the vapour line during inventory.

The FIV can also support quicker restarts following feed outages. When evaluating the benefits of an FIV system, refineries can examine previous start-ups and feed outages to identify delays caused by reactor-regenerator repairs, blind handling or decisions about how the unit should be parked.

Supporting shutdowns and turnaround planning

An FIV can also provide greater flexibility when preparing for a major turnaround. Where the reactor-regenerator is on the project’s critical path, the valve may allow catalyst withdrawal to be completed and reactor-regenerator manways to be opened earlier. This reduces the time required to reach the maintenance window.

Oil refinery processing plant with towers, pipework and storage tanks beneath a blue sky.

A refinery complex where FCCU isolation plays an important role in safe and efficient operations.


If work is required on the reactor-regenerator, the valve may also allow the main column to be isolated and subsequently blinded without first deinventorying the main column and gas concentration system. Subject to the refinery’s operating procedures and risk assessment, the main column and gas concentration system may then be kept on circulation while outage work proceeds. These capabilities provide operational flexibility, but every application must be assessed within the design and safeguarding philosophy of the individual FCCU.

Engineering the FIV installation

For this refinery, IMI was asked to advise on options for upgrading the existing FCCU. By engaging with the end user and EPC at an early stage, the engineering team was able to understand the application requirements, address technical queries and complete the calculations needed to integrate the valve. They were able to do so without compromising the plant’s safety or functionality.

Our engineering experts recommended a purpose-built FCCU Fractionator Isolation Valve. The design incorporates double discs and double isolation, together with a reinforced body capable of accommodating high line loads. Erosion-resistant seating supports durability in abrasive, high-temperature service. The technology was available in sizes ranging from 6 to 100 inches, with multiple mounting orientations, a choice of purge media and double-block-and-purge functionality. We have designed it for hydrocarbon vapour, coke and steam service across a quoted temperature range of -46°C to 700°C.

At 100 inches, the valve installed at the refinery represents one of the largest FIV upgrades completed by IMI and, according to the project information, one of the largest FIVs in the world.

Important design and operating considerations

Installing an FIV is not simply a matter of placing a valve in the line. The complete application must be assessed as part of the FCCU’s wider process, mechanical and safeguarding philosophy. As part of this evaluation process, our engineers will assess the FCCU’s operating speed, the operational temperature range, its shut-off requirements, any variations in the operating conditions and ultimately how best the FIV can be installed.

Continuous body purging

A continuous purge through the valve body is a common feature of this type of installation. Your purge system should include appropriate monitoring, including consideration of high- and low-flow alarms. And all engineering assessments must also address purge condensate and the possibility of coking, fouling or erosion within the valve. Partial-stroke activities may be considered as part of your site’s maintenance strategy to help prevent material build-up, subject to the approved operating procedure.

Protection against unintended closure

The design should prevent the valve from closing accidentally during normal operation. Measures may include a mechanical locking pin or de-energising a motor-driven actuator, depending on the approved design.

Our engineering experts specifically advise that an RIV should not be connected to an emergency shutdown system. An unintended or spurious closure could overpressure your reactor. Reactor overpressure protection may therefore need to be assessed as part of the overall design. Valve-closure indication should also be available through the distributed control system.

Access, venting and mechanical integrity

The installation should provide permanent, unrestricted access for personnel to the valve and local pushbuttons. An upstream vent should remain usable, with coking of the vapour-line vent considered during design and operational review.

Mechanical analysis of the main column and vapour line is also required, particularly for a valve of this scale. The assessment should account for line loads, support arrangements and the effect of the valve installation on the adjoining equipment. Tightness testing must form part of the commissioning and ongoing integrity strategy.

Operating with the valve closed

Oil and gas refining facilities must evaluate the implications of catalyst circulation while the valve is closed. This includes reviewing your pressure balance and ensuring that the operating mode does not introduce new hazards or compromise reactor-regenerator protection. These considerations reinforce an important point: an FIV installation is a complete engineered isolation solution, not simply a valve purchase.

Manual blind and automatic FIV cost comparison

Prior to the successful installation of the system at the refinery, we worked with the customer to evaluate the operational and financial differences between manual blind operation and the automated FIV solution.

With the FIV operating on a shorter 30-minute cycle, the automated process required just 4% of the operational effort of the manual approach. Based on the project’s financial model, this resulted in calculated average savings of $631,680 per year over a five-year maintenance cycle. The FIV calculation assumed one operator, no additional installation equipment, and 0.5 hours per half-cycle, resulting in a calculated full-cycle cost of $33,733.

These figures are based on the project’s specified assumptions for labour, equipment, downtime and operating requirements. Actual savings will vary between facilities depending on individual site conditions and operational practices.

The value delivered to the refinery

The installation provided the refinery with an engineered means of isolating the main fractionator from the reactor-regenerator, while reducing its dependence on manual intervention during relevant operating transitions.

The principal benefits identified for the facility included:

  • Reducing the assessed isolation activity from 12–24 hours to approximately two hours

  • Reducing the immediate operating requirement from an eight-person crew and lifting equipment to one remote operator

  • Limiting personnel exposure during isolation and blind-handling activities

  • Enabling the main column and gas concentration system to be prepared in parallel with reactor-regenerator start-up

  • Supporting greater flexibility during feed outages, shutdowns and turnaround preparation

  • Reducing calculated lifecycle costs under the assumptions used in the project model

These benefits do not remove any need you may have for approved isolation procedures, process hazard analysis, or physical blinding where personnel entry is required. Instead, the FIV provides you with an additional engineered safeguard and a more flexible means of establishing process isolation.

Rethinking established FCC isolation practices

This project demonstrates the value of examining practices that may have remained unchanged since a facility was commissioned. The refinery originally relied on a traditional manual-blind isolation philosophy. By installing an automatic 100-inch FIV, the facility introduced a new layer of process isolation while improving the flexibility of start-up, shutdown and turnaround activities.

The successful installation does not suggest that a valve can replace all of your requirements for physical blinding. Instead, it shows how an appropriately engineered FIV can reduce personnel exposure, shorten relevant operational activities and help your teams prevent air from the reactor-regenerator mixing with hydrocarbons from the main fractionator.

For refineries considering a similar upgrade, the decision should extend beyond the valve itself. The assessment must include the unit’s pressure balance, overpressure protection, purge system, mechanical loading, catalyst circulation strategy, vent arrangements, process hazard analysis, and procedures for personnel entry.

When these factors are considered together, FIV technology can help an existing refinery modernise its FCC isolation philosophy without losing sight of the fundamental objective: protecting people, equipment, and operational continuity.

Need expert input on a similar challenge?

IMI specialists can help you explore the right approach for your operational goals, technical questions or next steps.
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